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already opened the door to admitting parole-related evidence. Attorneys
should heavily rely on Gardner v. Florida,2 2 which gives the defendant
a general right to introduce evidence that rebuts evidence relied upon by
the state to justify the death penalty. Moreover, in Skipper v. South
Carolina23 JusticePowell's concurring opinion made clearthat although
22 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
23 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
certain evidence might not normally be admitted in mitigation, it must be
allowed in order to rebut the state's aggravating evidence.
Summary and analysis by:
Lesley Meredith James
KING v. COMMONWEALTH
243 Va. 353, 416 S.E.2d 669 (1992)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On October 8, 1990, Danny Lee King, recently released on parole,
and his wife by a bigamous marriage, Becky Hodges King, stole a van.
Three days later, they lured Carolyn Horton Rogers, a real estate agent,
into a vacant house in a residential section of Roanoke. Later that
afternoon, Ms. Rogers was discovered murdered in the basement of the
house. The evidence indicated that Rogers had been struck continuously
about the head and face, choked, thrown against a wall, and finally
stabbed in the chest. King and Becky took Roger's jewelry, checkbook,
and car. On October 15th, King and Becky were arrested in the stolen van
in Ohio. While Becky was immediately charged with the capital murder
of Carolyn Rogers, King was arrested only for violating parole.
Although King was not formally being held in connection with Ms.
Roger's murder, the police made two investigatory visits to King in order
to get hair and blood specimens, foot impressions, and handwriting
samples. During those visits, which took place on November 1 st and 9th
of 1990, King indicated that he wanted to talk about the murder of Ms.
Rogers. After being read his Miranda rights, King said he would make
a statement about the case if the officers would appoint an attorney for
him and arrange a meeting with his lawyer, Becky's lawyer, the
Commonwealth's attorney, and the officers.
In both instances, the officers replied that because King was not
charged with the murder of Ms. Rogers, counsel could not be appointed.
OfficerKern said to King on November I st, that hedid not"have any way
of appointing him [an attorney] at [that] particular time," but suggested
that King could retain his own attorney. King made a similar request and
received a similar response during the November 9th meeting. After his
request was denied, during both the November 1st and 9th visits, King
made statements to the police which later proved to be incriminating.
King finally was charged with the Rogers murder on January 4,
1991, and was convicted of capital murder in the commission of a
robbery. At the sentencing phase of the trial, King attempted to introduce
evidence that he would not be eligible for parole for at least thirty years,
but the trial court refused to admit the evidence. 1 The jury convicted
King of capital murder in the commission of robbery while armed with
a deadly weapon, and fixed his punishment at death.2 King's co-
defendant, Becky Hodges King, received five consecutive twelve month
I However, the court did admit evidence of unadjudicated acts as
aggravating evidence. For example, an unadjudicated theft charge,
King's bigamous marriage, and incidents of violent behavior in his
wife's home were relied upon by the Commonwealth.
2 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(4) (1990). Thejury also convicted King
of robbery, two offenses of forgery, and two offenses of uttering, with
punishment fixed at life imprisonment for robbery and ten years'
imprisonment for each of the other four non-capital offenses.
3 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
sentences as a result of her involvement in the case.
King's appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court alleged that his
statements to the police on November 1st and 9th should have been
suppressed because they were obtained in violation of Edwards v.
Arizona,3 that the trial court erred by not allowing him to introduce
evidence of his parole ineligibility, and that his sentence was excessive




The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rulings
regarding the admission of his statements on several grounds: (1) that
because adversarial judicial proceedings had not begun, King's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel had not attached; (2) King had failed to
unequivocally assert his right to counsel; and (3) the officers had not
engaged in "interrogation" within Miranda's meaning.5 As to evidence
of parole eligibility, the court affirmed its earlier rulings that such
evidence is inadmissible. 6 Finally, the court concluded that King's
sentence was not disproportionate or excessive, even though his co-




In King and the recent capital case of Eaton v. Commonwealth,8 the
Virginia Supreme Court addressed police behavior apparently designed
to circumvent defendant's Sixth Amendment and Miranda rights to
counsel.
A. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
In finding that King's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not
been violated, the court placed a great deal of weight on the fact that King
had not yet formally been charged with the murder at the time of the
investigatory visits.9 In Arizona v. Roberson, the U.S. Supreme Court
distinguished Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel by stating
4 King also argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that
he, rather than Becky, his co-defendant, committed the murder. The
court dismissed this claim, and it will not be discussed in this summary.
5 King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353,360,416 S.E.2d 669,672
(1992).
6 Id. at 368, 416 S.E.2d at 677.
7 Id. at 369-372, 416 S.E.2d at 677-679.
8 240 Va. 236, 397 S.E.2d 385 (1990).
9 King, 243 Va. at 360,416 S.E.2d at 672.
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that the Sixth Amendment protects an individual from a "state apparatus
geared up to prosecute," while the Fifth Amendment is merely a protec-
tion against the "inherent pressures of custodial interrogation." 10 Con-
sequently, the Sixth Amendment right only attaches once judicial pro-
ceedings have begun against the defendant.
Of interest in King is that the state deliberately took actions to avoid
having King's Sixth Amendment rights attach. Although the state
immediately charged Becky with the capital murder, they arrested King
on parole violation charges and waited over two months to file the capital
murder charge which would trigger his right to counsel on the charge.
Through this tactic the state was able to keep King in custody and
investigate the murder without, according to the Virginia Supreme
Court, running afoul of his right to counsel.t l
B. Right to Counsel under Miranda v. Arizona
As to King's statements that he wanted an attorney, the Virginia
Supreme Court found his requests were equivocal, in part because at the
same time he requested an attorney for himself King also asked that
Becky's attorney and the Commonwealth attorney be present. 12 In
Edwards v. Arizona, the Court held that once an accused expresses his
desire to deal with the police only through counsel, he is not subject to
further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further commu-
nication with the police. 13 The Virginia Supreme Court has required that
a request for counsel must be "unambiguous and unequivocal" to invoke
Edwards.
14
Although in Smith v. Illinois,15 the U.S. Supreme Court chose not
to define specifically what circumstances qualify as an invocation of
counsel, the Court did discuss three acceptable approaches. Of these
approaches, even the strictest standard for finding that the right to
counsel had been invoked stated that: "'an assertion of the right to
counsel need not be explicit, unequivocal, or made with unmistak-
able clarity.. .'."16 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit's holding inPoyner v.
Murrayl7appears to contradict directly the Virginia Supreme Court:
"once a suspect makes an equivocal request for an attorney, all interro-
gation must cease except that which is necessary to clarify whether or not
the accused wants an attorney."
Thus, the Virginia Supreme Court in King and Eaton imposed a
higher standard on defendants for invoking their right to counsel than
even the strictest standard that has been recognized by the United States
Supreme Court. The Virginia standard also appears to conflict with the
Fourth Circuit's holdings. As the dissent in Eaton pointed out, the
Virginia Supreme Court's high standard of a clear, unequivocal request
places an improper burden on the defendant: "a principle objective of
[Miranda] was to allow a defendant to request counsel 'in any manner'
and at any stage of the proceeding."
18
10 486 U.S. 675, 684 (1988).
11 In the leading case on deliberate circumvention by the police of
the right to counsel, Maine v. Moulton, the United States Supreme Court
stated that: "[K]nowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to
confront the accused without counsel being present is as much a breach
of the State's obligation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of
counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity." 474 U.S.
159, 177 (1985).
12 King, 243 Va. at 360,416 S.E.2d at 672. The court suggests that
King could not validly request counsel unless he seeks a meeting with his
lawyer in "the traditional atmosphere of confidentiality." Id.
13 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 (1981).
14 Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236,253,397 S.E.2d 385,395
(1990) (citing Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 304 S.E.2d 271
(1983)).
15 469 U.S. 89, 101 (1984).
16 Id. at 97, n.3 (citing People v. Krueger, 82 Ill.2d 305, 311,412
N.E.2d 537, 540 (1980)) (emphasis added). The quotation continues:
The Virginia Supreme Court's analysis of King's waiver of his
Miranda rights is also questionable. The Court relies in part on a United
States Supreme Court case addressing the waiver of Fourth Amendment
rights, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,19 for its waiver standard. Yet in
Bustamonte, one of the Court's major points in that case was that the
waiver standard for the Fourth Amendment was a less exacting standard
than for Fifth Amendment rights. 20 Indeed, in Edwards itself the
Supreme Court cited as one of its grounds for reversal that Arizona had
improperly relied upon Bustamonte in determining whether Miranda
rights were properly waived.2 t The Virginia Supreme Court's waiver
standard for Miranda rights thus also appears vulnerable to challenge as
not being in accord with federal constitutional standards.
Defense attorneys face an unusual challenge in cases where the
authorities fail to recognize an invocation of counsel by the defendant. In
order to control the damage in a similar situation, defense counsel must
preserve any federal constitutional argument by raising the issue at the
earliest possible opportunity, which will usually be at a suppression
hearing. Defense counsel should also continually raise the issue through-
out the proceedings. Defense counsel should argue that the holdings in
King and Eaton regarding invocation of counsel and waiver contradict
the clear holding of the Fourth Circuit in Poyner and are contrary to the
United States Supreme Court's holdings in Miranda and Edwards.
Moreover, defense counsel must clarify the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Smith v. Illinois by noting that although the Court
avoided promulgating a bright line rule for invocation of counsel, it did
imply that invocation of the right to counsel need not be unequivocal; the
Virginia Supreme Court's standard does not meet that standard.
II. Parole Eligibility
At the sentencing phase of his trial, King sought to introduce
evidence that he would remain in prison for at least thirty years if thejury
declined to impose the death penalty. King argued that under Skipper v.
South Carolina22 any evidence that a defendant offers which may serve
"as a basis for a sentence less than death" must be admitted under the
Eighth Amendment. King attempted to distinguish his case from prior
Virginia cases by arguing that he was offering evidence of parole
ineligibility, rather than evidence of eligibility at "an unspecified future
date."
The court dismissed the Skipper contention, noting that Skipper did
"not involve any question relating to parole ineligibility. ' 23 In addition,
the court failed to recognize any distinction between King's parole
ineligibility evidence and similar claims rejected by the court in the past.
The Court dealt with this matter in summary fashion, reaffirming its
earlier decisions,24 simply stating that "parole is not a proper matter for
consideration by a jury."
25
"but not 'every reference to an attorney no matter how vague should
constitute an invocation of the right to counsel'."
17 964 F.2d 1404, 1410 (1992) (quoting United States v. Jardina,
747 F.2d. 945, 948 (5th Cir. 1984)).
18 Eaton, at 262, 397 S.E.2d at 400, (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. 436
at 444) (Lacy, J., dissenting).
19 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).
20 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 242.
21 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 483-84.
22 476 U.S. 1,5, (1986) (quotingLockettv. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604
(1978)).
23 King, 243 Va. at 367, 416 S.E.2d at 677, n.3.
24 See e.g., Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341,385 S.E.2d 50
(1989), and case summary of Watkins, Capital Defense Digest Vol. 2,
No. 1, p. 15 (1989); O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341,385 S.E.2d
50 (1989); Williams v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 168,178-180; Poynerv.
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401,432, 329 S.E.2d 815, 836-837 (1985).
25 King, 243 Va. at 368, 416 S.E.2d at 677.
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Although the Virginia courts continue to reject admission of parole
eligibility evidence, defense counsel should persist in presenting this
issue for consideration, especially where the prosecution relies on future
dangerousness as an aggravating factor.26 Defense counsel may ap-
proach the parole eligibility issue in several different ways. First of all,
defense counsel may raise the issue pretrial during voir dire. Jurors'
misperceptions of the actual length of a life sentence can be extremely
damaging to the defendant at the sentencing phase.27 During voir dire,
jurors could be questioned as to whether they are capable of considering
a sentence less than death if they were prohibited from considering parole
eligibility and the defendant's ultimate return to society.28 Additionally,
counsel could use voir dire to identify and correct juror misconceptions
in this area.
29
At the sentencing phase, defense counsel should argue that evidence
ofparole ineligibility should be admitted not only as mitigating evidence,
but also to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence of future dangerousness.
If a defendant can show that he will not be eligible for release for twenty-
five or more years, such evidence tends to refute the Commonwealth's
case on the issue offuture dangerousness because society at large will not
be put at risk.
Finally, it can also be argued that in order to deliver a just verdict,
thejury must be properly informed of the consequences oftheirchoosing
a verdict of life rather than death. Without evidence of parole eligibility,
the jury cannot determine whether a life sentence will properly and
severely punish the defendant. Admission of sections of the Virginia
Code could greatly aid thejury in making its decision. Section 53.1-151,
for example, contains precise rules for when parole will be denied to a
defendant due to sentences which have already been imposed.
III. Excessiveness and Disproportionality of Sentence
King contended that because his codefendant only received five
consecutive twelve-month sentences, his death sentence was dispropor-
tionate and excessive. King also claimed the death penalty was excessive
because he lacked a "prior record of violence and criminal conduct which
resulted in injury to others."30
After a detailed account of King's criminal history, the court
dismissed King's claims that he did not pose a future threat to society and
26 See Straube, The Capital Defendant and Parole Eligibility,
Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
27 See Paduano & Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions
Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum.
Hum, Rts. L. Rev. 211,221-22 & nn. 30-34 (1987).
28 Defense counsel unsuccessfully employed this strategy in
Eaton, 240 Va. at 248, 397 S.E.2d at 392.
2 9 SeeMorgan v.Illinois, 112 S.Ct. 2222 (1992), and case summary
of Morgan, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
that he lacked a criminal record.31 As for the disproportionality claim,
the court quoted its decision in Stamper v. Commonwealth: ".[t]he test is
not whether a jury may be inclined to recommend the death penalty in a
particular case but rather whether juries in this jurisdiction impose the
death sentence for conduct similar to that of the defendant.' ' 32 The court
proceeded to note that because Becky Hodges King, King's codefendant,
was convicted as an accessory after the fact, their sentences could not
fairly be compared.33 The court concluded its proportionality analysis
by finding that King's sentence was not disproportionate compared to
similar cases.
34
IV. Unadjudicated Acts and Future Dangerousness
Alhough not discussed in the King decision, the evidence used by
the prosecution at the penalty stage to prove future dangerousness serves
as a reminder for defense counsel to try to control the introduction of such
evidence. In King, the Commonwealth introduced as aggravating
evidence a possession of stolen property charge which was later nolle
prossed, evidence of his bigamous marriage to Becky Hodges King, and
evidence of violent behavior in the home of his legal wife.
35
Introduction of unadjudicated acts at the penalty stage of the trial
raises many concerns and should be objected to vigorously by defense
counsel. At a minimum, defense counsel should make a pretrial motion
for a bill of particulars, directing the Commonwealth to identify all
aggravating factors upon which it intends to rely in seeking the death
penalty in the event that the defendant is convicted of capital murder. If
the Commonwealth intends to rely on future dangerousness, the bill of
particulars should identify any unadjudicated acts by the defendant
which it intends to offer into evidence, as well as any related circum-
stances which are relevant to proof of that factor. Such a pretrial motion
may help to remedy the notice problems which defense counsel com-
monly face in the context of evidence of unadjudicated acts. Defense
counsel should also be ready to pursue objections to such evidence based
on due process arguments grounded in the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel and double jeopardy.
36
Summary and Analysis by:
Paul M. O'Grady
30 King, 243 Va. at 369,416 S.E.2d at 678.
31 Id. at 369-370,416 S.E. 2d at 678-679.
32 Id. at 371,416 S.E. 2d. at 679, (quoting Stamper, 220 Va. 260,
283-284, 257 S.E.2d 808, 824 (1979)).
33 Id. at 371,416 S.E.2d at 679.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 370, 416 S.E.2d at 678.
36 The Spring 1993 issue of the Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No.
2, will include an extended discussion ofprosecutorial use ofunadjudicated
acts evidence at the penalty stage.
